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Introduction
On June 28, 2007, a sharply divided United States
Supreme Court invalidated student assignment plans in Seattle,
Washington and Louisville, Kentucky that were designed to
promote racial diversity and to address racial isolation in K-12
education. By a 5-to-4 vote in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. I and McFarland v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, the Court struck down voluntary
integration plans under the "strict scrutiny" standard applied to
race-conscious policies challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ruled that the plans
were not narrowly tailored to the interests asserted by the school
districts.'
t. Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. E-Mail:
AAncheta@scu.edu. Address: SantaClara University School of Law, 500 El
Camino Real, Santa Clara, California 95053. This paper was prepared for the
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law
School (September 2007).
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court's ruling in Parents Involvedin Community
Schools is disappointing and troubling for a number of reasons.
First, the ruling significantly limits the use of race by school
districts voluntarily seeking to integrate their schools, at a time
when racial isolation and resegregation are increasing nationwide.
Second, when viewed in the context of the Court's landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the ruling marks a sharp
turn in the Court's historical commitment to addressing racial
segregation in public schools. Third, the ruling sends a strong
signal that a majority of the Court's current membership is highly
skeptical of race-conscious policies designed to promote equality
and the integration of public institutions. Indeed, four members
of the Court, including its two newest members, appear ready to
strike down any deployment of race designed to advance equal
opportunity.
Nevertheless, because of the voting alignment of
the Justices in these cases and the limits of the Court's
rulings, school districts retain the ability to employ race-conscious
measures designed to integrate their schools. Five of the Justices
endorsed the compelling interests in reducing racial isolation and
in promoting educational diversity in elementary and secondary
schools, and the opinions of those Justices provide guidance on
how school districts might proceed in designing constitutionally
permissible policies. Moreover, the Supreme Court as a whole
made clear that Grutter v. Bollinger, its 2003 ruling upholding the
use of race to promote student body diversity in higher education,
is good law.
This paper examines the Seattle and Louisville cases and
discusses their impact on K-12 education and constitutional
doctrine. The analysis is divided into three parts. Part I examines
the Justices' opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools
Vol. IO:SE
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VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
and discusses the constitutional boundaries for voluntary race-
conscious integration policies established by the Court. Part II
discusses the implications of the cases in creating and implementing
K-12 policies designed to avoid racial isolation and to promote
educational diversity. Part III assesses the impact of the cases on
equal protection doctrine and race-conscious policy making more
generally.
L The Constitutional Limits ofRace- Conscious
Integration Policies: Understanding the Parents
Involved in Community Schools Opinions
Because the voting alignment and reasoning of the Justices in
Parents Involved in Community Schools are critical in determining
controlling constitutional principles, it is necessary to examine
the Justices' separate opinions and to analyze how the opinions
interrelate.2 Justice Anthony Kennedy joined Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, along with Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas, to form the five-member majority to strike
down the Seattle and Louisville plans. However, Justice Kennedy
did not join key passages of Chief Justice Roberts' plurality
opinion and made clear in his opinion that he flatly disagreed
with important elements of the plurality's reasoning. In addition,
a different majority of the Justices, composed of Justice Kennedy
and dissenting Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
2. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and his opin-
ion was joined in full by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment and joined Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C of Chief
Justice Roberts' four-part plurality opinion. Justice Thomas issued a separate
concurring opinion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens, issued a dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also issued a dissenting
opinion.
2008
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
David Souter, and John Paul Stevens, endorsed the school
districts' compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation and in
promoting diversity, and thus have provided bases for educational
policy makers to employ race-conscious policies in the future and
still comply with the Equal Protection Clause.
A. ChiefJustice Roberts' Opinion
Justice Kennedy joined Parts I, II, III-A and III-C of Chief
Justice Roberts' four-part plurality opinion in Parents Involved in
Community Schools; these parts of the Roberts' opinion constitute
a formal opinion of the Court. Part I of the Roberts' opinion
discusses the factual and procedural context of the two cases and
examines the basic mechanics of the Seattle and Louisville plans.'
Part II addresses a threshold issue involving whether the Court
had jurisdiction in the Seattle case because of the plaintiffs' lack of
standing to sue; the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction.4
Part 111-A discusses the standard of review and the applicability
of the Court's prior ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger.5 Part III-C
focuses on the question of whether the Seattle and Louisville
plans are narrowly tailored and provides reasoning for the Court's
invalidation of the two plans.6
Parts III-B and IV of the Roberts opinion examine the school
districts' justifications for their policies and contain arguments
designed to counter the dissenting opinions of Justice Breyer
and Justice Stevens. While they do not reflect an opinion of the
Court, these parts of the Roberts opinion are significant because
3. 127 S. Ct. at 2746-50.
4. Id. at 2750-51.
5. Id. at 2751-54.
6. Id. at 2759-61.
Vol. 10:SE
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VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
they stand in stark contrast to Justice Kennedy's reasoning in the
cases, and, as discussed below, contain startling interpretations of
Brown v. Board of Education and equal protection jurisprudence
that mark an extreme departure from longstanding interpretations
of the Constitution.
1. Opinion of the Court
Parts II-A and II-C of the Roberts opinion are central to
the Court's holding in Parents Involved in Community Schools.
Part 11-A confirms that the standard of review in evaluating
student assignment policies that classify on the basis of race is
strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard of review used by the
courts to evaluate policies under the Equal Protection Clause.
Under strict scrutiny, the courts ask two questions to assess the
ends and the means that underlie a race-conscious policy: (1)
Is the goal of the policy sufficiently important to constitute a
compelling governmental interest? and (2) is the policy narrowly
tailored to that compelling interest? A negative answer to either of
these inquiries invalidates a race-conscious policy. Although the
Roberts opinion recognized that context matters in strict scrutiny,7
the majority did not adjust or relax its strict scrutiny inquiries;
nor did the majority extend any deference to the school districts
because of the K- 12 educational context or because the plans were
designed to promote integration and not to subordinate racial
minority group members.
7. Id. at 2754.
2008
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
a. Compelling Interest
The Court concluded in Part I1-A of the Roberts opinion
that the interests asserted by the school districts to justify their
race-conscious policies are distinct from two interests that the
Court previously recognized as compelling: (1) remedying the
present effects of past discrimination, and (2) promoting student
body diversity in higher education. Arguing that an interest in
remedying past discrimination was not applicable to the Seattle
and Louisville cases, the Court emphasized the distinction between
de jure segregation arising through the intentional separation of
students by force of law from de facto segregation in which racial
isolation results from other factors, such as residential housing
patterns and private-sector discrimination. The Louisville schools,
the majority argued, had been released in 2000 from a longstanding
court order to desegregate their schools. The majority further
argued that the Seattle schools had never been "segregated by law"
and were not subject to a desegregation decree, notwithstanding
extensive evidence of discrimination in local housing and other
factors affecting student enrollment, as well as a memorandum of
agreement between the school district and the federal Office for
Civil Rights to desegregate the schools.8
8. See id. at 2752. The Court also dismissed, as dicta, key language from the
Court's 1971 decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
which would suggest that school districts could employ race-conscious mea-
sures in the absence of de jure segregation and a court order. Id. at n.10. That
language states: "School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power
to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting
the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy
is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities . Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
Vol. 10:SE
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VOLUNTARYSCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
The majority's analysis also distinguished an educational
diversity interest in higher education recognized in Grutter--
where race was but one dimension of a broader student body
diversity-from a racial diversity interest used to justify the
school districts' student assignment plans: "The Court in Grutter
expressly articulated key limitations on its holding-defining
a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique
context of higher education . . . ."' The Court then declared
that, despite the parallels and linkages between K-12 education
and higher education, "[t]he present cases are not governed by
Grutter."1 o
Because of this turn in logic, among other reasons, neither
Justice Kennedy nor the dissenting Justices agreed with the
plurality's subsequent conclusions that Grutter provided no
support for the school districts' asserted interests. The Chief
Justice's reading of Grutter is indeed inconsistent with key
language in the Grutter opinion itself, where the Court stressed
the importance of diversity throughout the educational system:
in upholding the compelling interest in higher education
diversity, the Grutter opinion states that the Court has "repeatedly
acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students
for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to
'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of society."'1
Because of Justice Kennedy's basic disagreement with Chief
Justice Roberts' analysis of the school districts' compelling interest
arguments (contained in Part 111-B of the Roberts opinion), there
9. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch.,127 S. Ct. at 2754.
10. Id,
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982)).
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
is no holding from the Court addressing whether the school
districts' interests in promoting racial diversity and in avoiding
racial isolation are compelling. Nor is there a holding by the
Court that these interests are not compelling. Instead, the Court's
invalidation of the Seattle and Louisville plans turns on the narrow
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.
b. Narrow Tailoring
The Supreme Court has not established a fixed test for
narrow tailoring, but in assessing whether a race-conscious
policy is narrowly tailored, the Court typically looks at an array
of factors, such as whether a policy is necessary to achieve an
asserted goal, whether it is sufficiently flexible, whether it unduly
burdens non-minorities, whether race-neutral policies have been
considered as alternatives, and whether time limits or periodic
reviews lead to a logical endpoint for the policy.12 In Part 111-C of
the Roberts opinion, the majority concludes in summary fashion
that the Seattle and Louisville plans are not narrowly tailored for
two reasons: first, employing race in student assignments was not
necessary to achieve the goal of racial diversity, and second, the
school districts failed to show that they had considered adequate
race-neutral alternatives.
i. The Seattle and Louisville Plans
Both school districts operated "controlled choice" policies
that employed race as one of multiple factors in deciding whether
a student might be assigned to a particular school; in different
12. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-43; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987).
Vol. 10:SE
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VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
ways, the plans managed student assignments consistent with
district-wide demographics and broad numerical goals.13 Under
the Seattle plan, entering high school students were given a choice
to attend any three of the district's ten high schools and to rank
them in order of preference. If there were more students who
ranked a particular high school first than there were available
spaces at the school, the district employed a series of "tiebreakers"
to determine whether a student would be assigned to that school.
Under an initial tiebreaker, a preference was given to students with
a sibling attending an oversubscribed school. Students were then
assigned based on their geographic proximity to the school, unless
the school was racially imbalanced-i.e., the racial composition
of the school's student body differed from the district's average by
more than fifteen percentage points.14
Under the Louisville plan, which evolved from a court-
ordered plan that had been in place from 1975 to 2000 to
desegregate the Louisville schools, the district employed a broad
guideline that every school should seek a black student enrollment
ranging from 15 percent to 50 percent.' 5 The guideline was
employed to evaluate requests for transfers from students' "resides"
13. The details of the Seattle and Louisville plans are beyond the scope of this
Paper. An extensive history and analysis of the plans are contained in Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion, while a more abbreviated analysis is contained in
Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
14. In 2001-02, the most recent year that the plan was employed, approxi-
mately 60% of the district's roughly 46,000 students were non-white and ap-
proximately 40% were white. Because of residential segregation, over 75% of
the district's minority students live in the southern half of the city, and approxi-
mately two-thirds of the white students live in the northern half of the city.
15. During the 2003-04 school year, the Jefferson County Public Schools en-
rolled approximately 97,000 students, of which approximately 34% were black
and 66% were "other" (almost all of whom were white). See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
2008
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAWREVIEW
schools-i.e., schools to which students were initially assigned
based on geographic residence. 'When employed, race could "tip
the balance" after residence, choice, and all other factors had
played a part in assessing the transfer request.
ii. Necessity of the Plans
The majority concluded in Part 111-C of the Roberts opinion
that the use of race had only minimal effects on student assignments
in the districts, suggesting that the plans were not a necessity and
therefore alternative policies would be more effective. The majority
found that in the Seattle school district, 307 student assignments
were affected by the racial tiebreaker during the 2000-01 school
year; the use of race made no difference in over one-third of the
assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker; and only 52 students
were adversely affected by the tiebreaker, in that they were assigned
to a school that had not been listed as a preference and to which
they would not have been otherwise assigned.16
The majority further found that elementary school students
in the Louisville schools had been assigned to their first- or
second-choice school 95 percent of the time; that transfers,
which constituted five percent of the assignments, were denied
only 35 percent of the time; and that presumably an even smaller
percentage were denied on the basis of the racial guidelines.17
The majority then noted that the racial guidelines would only
account for three percent of assignments. The majority went on
to conclude: "While we do not suggest that greater use of race
would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts' racial
classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity
16. Id. at 2796.
17. Id. at 2760.
Vol. 10:SE
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VOLUNTARYSCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
of using racial classifications." 18 In contrast, the majority added,
the consideration of race upheld in Grutter "was viewed as
indispensable in more than tripling minority representation at the
[University of Michigan] law school-from 4 to 14.5%."19
The majority's discussion of the necessity of the plans is
brief. There is no analysis of alternative policies, nor does the
majority recognize the actual effects of the plans on promoting
diversity and preventing racial isolation. Language accompanying
the Court's necessity analysis is particularly telling, however, and
seems consistent with the plurality's predisposition to strike down
any race-based classification and assignment system: "Classifying
and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception
of race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents and our
Nation's history of using race in public schools, and requires more
than such an amorphous end to justify it."20
In concluding that neither of the policies was a necessity, the
Court's analysis also reveals a tension in its narrow tailoring
inquiry. In order to comply with prior case law and to avoid other
narrow tailoring concerns, the plans intentionally limited race as
a factor in student assignments. The relatively mild uses of race
employed by the districts were designed to prevent problems
of inflexibility or undue burden, but were not sufficient to
satisfy the Court's inquiry into necessity. Ironically, the districts
were penalized for not using race enough to make a sufficiently
meaningful difference in student enrollments.
18. Id. (emphasis in original).
19. Id.
20. Id.
2008
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
iii. Race-Neutral Alternatives
In addition to relying on necessity grounds to invalidate
the plans, the majority concluded in Part 111-C that the districts
failed to satisfy narrow tailoring because they had not engaged
in "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives.121 The majority ruled that the Seattle school district
had rejected several alternative assignment plans with little or
no consideration-although Chief Justice Roberts provides
no discussion of why the district might have rejected those
alternatives as less effective or inferior to the challenged plans.
The majority further ruled that the Louisville school district had
failed to present evidence that it had considered race-neutral
alternatives at all. The long history of court-ordered desegregation
in the Louisville schools, which extended over 25 years from
1975 to 2000, appeared to play no role in Chief Justice Roberts'
consideration of the need for alternative policies.
2. Parts III-B and IV of the Roberts Opinion
Although he voted to strike down the Seattle and Louisville
plans on narrow tailoring grounds, Justice Kennedy declined to
join Part III-B of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, which focuses on
the compelling interests of the school districts. Justice Kennedy
also declined to join Part IV of the Roberts opinion, which, in
addressing the dissents' central criticisms, contains remarkable
language that attempts to recast Brown v. Board of Education
and other leading equal protection cases. Neither Part III-B nor
Part IV form part of the opinion of the Court, but they deserve
serious attention because of the extremity of many of Chief Justice
21. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
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Roberts' arguments. They also reflect the views of the Court's two
newest members, the Chief Justice and Justice Alito.
a. Part Ill-B
In Part III-B of the Roberts opinion, the plurality addresses
the school districts' interests in promoting racial diversity and
in avoiding racial isolation and resegregation. After decoupling
Grutter and the diversity interest in higher education from the
K-12 educational context, Chief Justice Roberts does not address
the question of whether the school districts' interests achieve
the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity. Instead, the Chief Justice's opinion recharacterizes
the school districts' asserted interests as "racial balancing." His
opinion states: "In design and operation, the plans are directed
only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court
has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. The plans are tied to
each district's specific racial demographics, rather than to any
pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the
asserted educational benefits. 22 The Chief Justice's opinion goes
on to criticize the districts for not offering sufficient evidence to
explain why the level of racial diversity to achieve the asserted
educational benefits necessarily coincided with the racial
demographics of each district.
Regardless of the strength or appropriateness of the
demographic evidence introduced by the districts, the Chief
Justice's rhetorical use of the term "racial balancing" effectively
severs any meaningful connection between the use of racial
demographics and the districts' goals of attaining the benefits of
diversity and of avoiding the harms of racial isolation. Once the
22. Id. at 2755.
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
districts' interests were recharacterized as interests in numerical
balancing and racial proportionality, the plurality invalidated
the districts' interests because of language in prior Supreme
Court opinions proposing that "'outright racial balancing' is
'patently unconstitutional. ''23 Chief Justice Roberts thus argued
that "[a]ccepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest
would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout
American society. 24
But, as Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer emphasize in
their opinions, the interests of the school districts are not merely
designed to promote racial proportionality for proportionality's
sake. Instead, they are tied to preventing concrete harms associated
with segregated schools and to promoting concrete educational
benefits associated with diverse student bodies. The Roberts
plurality makes short shrift of the long history of legal precedents
dating back to Brown v. Board of Education, where the federal
courts imposed strong remedies to address the extensive harms
of racially segregated schools. Moreover, the plurality opinion
ignores the substantial body of recent social science research
demonstrating the harms of racial isolation and resegregation, as
well as the educational benefits of racially diverse schools. 25
b. Part IV
Part IV is the most provocative and controversial section
of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, and it is extraordinary in its
attempt to refashion the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education
as one of uncompromising colorblindness. It is not a novel claim
23. Id. at 2757 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2755.
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to assert that Brown's core norm is an anticlassification principle
that prohibits any differential treatment on the basis of race, but
such a claim has never enjoyed the support of a majority of the
Justices on the Supreme Court-and it still does not. Nonetheless,
the Roberts plurality opinion is striking in its rhetoric and its
reinterpretation of Brown, and even goes so far as to recast the
Brown litigators as champions of absolute race-blindness.
Proposing that "when it comes to using race to assign
children to schools, history will be heard, 26 Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion ignores the decades-long history of racial subordination
associated with segregated schools and focuses instead on the
simple recognition of racial differences as the underlying harm
recognized in Brown: "It was not the inequality of the facilities but
the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which
the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954.27 And
quoting Brown v. Board ofEducation II, the Court's 1955 opinion
on remedying school segregation, the Roberts opinion further
states that Brown I "required school districts 'to achieve a system
of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial
basis. '28
In determining which side is "more faithful to the heritage
of Brown," 29 the Roberts opinion goes on to quote the Brown
plaintiffs' brief, which states in part that "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment
to American children on the basis of their color or race," and to
quote from the oral argument of Robert L. Carter, who argued for
26. Id. at 2767.
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294,
300-01 (1955)).
29. Id.
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the Brown plaintiffs in 1952, for the proposition that "no State has
any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational
opportunities among its citizens."30 Then, equating the Brown
case with the Seattle and Louisville cases, the Chief Justice goes
on to ask, "[w] hat do the racial classifications do in these cases,
if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?"
and then states, "[b] efore Brown, schoolchildren were told where
they could and could not go to school based on the color of
their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the
heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once
again-even for very different reasons."31 Finally, the Chief Justice
closes his opinion with the following statement: "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is stop discriminating on the
basis of race."32
c. The Kennedy and Dissenters' Responses
The remarkable language in Parts 111-B and Part IV of the
Roberts opinion led Justice Kennedy to disavow the plurality's
language and analysis. As Justice Kennedy states early in his
opinion: "My views do not allow me to join the balance of
the opinion by The Chief Justice, which seems to me to be
inconsistent in both its approach and its implications with the
history, meaning, and reach of the Equal Protection Clause."33
Justice Kennedy later states: "parts of the opinion by The Chief
Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot
30. Id. at 2767-68.
31. Id. at 2768.
32. Id.
33. Id at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
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be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into
account"34 and "[tlo the extent the plurality opinion suggests the
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities
must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in
my view, profoundly mistaken."35
The dissenting opinions in Parents Involved in Community
Schools are even more critical of the plurality, with Justice Stevens
stating that "[t]here is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice's reliance
on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education"36 and that "[t]
he Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's most
important decisions."37 Justice Breyer's lengthy dissenting opinion
contains even more excoriating language:
[The plurality] distorts precedent, it misapplies the
relevant constitutional principles, it announces legal
rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local
governments to deal effectively with the growing
resegregation of public schools, it threatens to
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-
related litigation, and it undermines Brown's promise
of integrated primary and secondary education that
local communities have sought to make a reality.
This cannot be justified in the name of the Equal
Protection Clause.38
Justice Breyer goes on pointedly to state: "[I]t is a cruel
distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950's to
Louisville and Seattle in the modern day-to equate the plight of
Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to
34. Id. at 2791.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2798.
38. Id. at 2800-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer
to a school closer to home was initially declined)."39 The incidental
cost of using a race-based label in the Seattle and Louisville cases,
Justice Breyer adds, "does not approach, in degree or in kind, the
terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years
of legal racial segregation."4 °
The consequences of Parents Involved in Community Schools
would be even more far-reaching and disquieting if the plurality's
arguments in Parts III-B and IV of the Roberts opinion spoke for
the Court. They do not. Justice Kennedy's refusal to join these
sections of the Roberts opinion tempers the impact of the case.
His opinion, along with Justice Breyer's dissent, sets a different
course for policy makers to follow in using race-conscious
measures to address racial isolation and promote diversity in the
nation's public schools.
B. Justice Kennedy's Opinion
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion explains his reasons for
voting to invalidate the Seattle and Louisville plans. The opinion
confirms that he agrees with the Roberts plurality that "in the
context of these plans, the small number of assignments affected
suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends
through different means."41 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion
offers his additional conclusions that the plans failed narrow
tailoring because they lacked precision and because the districts
39. Id. at 2836.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
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failed to articulate adequate justifications for their specific racial
classifications.
1. Narrow Tailoring and the Seattle and Louisville
Plans
In criticizing the plans, the Kennedy opinion stresses that
"the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives demanded by the
narrow tailoring analysis requires in many cases a thorough
understanding of how a plan works . . . As part of [the
government's burden] it must establish, in detail, how decisions
based on an individual student's race are made in a challenged
program. '4 2 The Jefferson County Board of Education failed, in
Justice Kennedy's opinion, to meet this basic mandate, because
the plan employed "terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot
withstand strict scrutiny."43
Justice Kennedy concluded that the Louisville plan failed
"to make clear, for example, who makes the decisions; what if
any oversight is employed; the precise circumstances in which
an assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of
race; or how it is determined which of two similarly situated
children will be subjected to a given race-based decision. 44
Although the Court's higher education affirmative action cases
suggest that transparency in a selection process employing race is
not mandated by the Constitution, Justice Kennedy concluded
that the Louisville school board had failed to show that its racial
classification procedures were narrowed to its specific interests,
42. Id. at 2789.
43. Id. at 2790.
44. Id.
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"rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and ad hoc manner
that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest."45
Justice Kennedy's criticism of the Seattle plan, on the other
hand, focuses less on imprecision than on the district's failure to
articulate adequate reasons for its racial classifications. In particular,
the district's division of students into the categories of "white" and
"non-white," according to Justice Kennedy, constituted a "blunt
distinction" that did not clearly advance the goals of promoting
diversity and reducing racial isolation, especially with a student
population with significant numbers of blacks, Asian Americans,
Latinos, and Native Americans. Discounting the argument that
minority populations in Seattle have been subjected to similar
histories of discrimination in education and housing, Justice
Kennedy's opinion states that "[f] ar from being narrowly tailored
to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and
the school district has provided no convincing explanation for its
design."46
2. Narrowly Tailored Policies and Race-Neutral
Alternatives
Although the Kennedy opinion concludes that the Seattle
and Louisville plans fail narrow tailoring analysis, Justice Kennedy
does provide three possibilities for upholding K-12 policies that
address racial isolation or promote diversity.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2791.
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a. "Last Resort" Racial Classifications
First, Justice Kennedy's opinion indicates in general terms
that some racial classifications, if indeed necessary, could satisfy
strict scrutiny. His opinion concludes that the Seattle and
Jefferson County boards of education "failed to provide the
support necessary" to show that there was no other way to avoid
racial isolation, but he nonetheless states that racial classifications
may be legitimate "if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling
interest. 47
Given Justice Kennedy's specific criticisms of the Seattle
and Louisville plans, this suggests that he might be willing to
uphold race-conscious student assignment policies if they have
been thoroughly tested against race-neutral alternatives, if they
are sufficiently precise and their implementation process is fully
explained, if they take into account the more nuanced racial and
ethnic compositions of the districts, and if they significantly affect
student assignments and school compositions so that the goals of
the plan are clearly attained because of the assignments. Although
these characteristics may be difficult to achieve, Justice Kennedy's
opinion does leave the door open to limited uses of race in student
assignments.
b. Grutter- Type Policies
Second, Justice Kennedy's opinion states that it is also
permissible to employ, "if necessary, a more nuanced, individual
evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that
might include race as a component. [This] approach would be
informed by Grutter, though of course the criteria relevant to
47. Id. at 2792.
2008
HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 317 2008-2009
 TARY  I IES 317 
. st  l sifications 
 '       
 ,   
.    
    i     
   
 i  
     
e t."47 
 '    
     
 i s  t    
ly tral ti s,  
    ti   
  t    
     tl  t 
t    ti s   
t  l   l l      .  
t  t i tics     ,  '  
i i        t 
. 
. tter- J licies 
, '      
   
  i tics  
t  .    
 t er,      
.  t . 
RUTGERS RACEAND LAWREVIEW
student placement would differ based on the age of the students,
the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools."48 Although
this passage does not provide precise guidance on what might
constitute a narrowly tailored policy, it points to the higher
education admissions procedures upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger
as a starting point. Permissible programs might include, for
example, a competitive admissions policy for a selective college
preparatory high school that employs race as a "plus" factor among
other factors designed to promote educational diversity within an
entering class. This type of program would have direct parallels to
the higher education admissions policies approved under Grutter.
What is not entirely clear, however, is how a Grutter-like policy-
based on individualized consideration of students-might be
implemented in non-competitive procedures and across large
populations of students and schools.
c. Non- Classification Policies
Third, Justice Kennedy's opinion articulates a set of K-12
educational policies that do not classify students by race and
should not trigger strict scrutiny at all, even though they may
involve some attention to race. In one key passage, he states:
In the administration of public schools by the state
and local authorities it is permissible to consider the
racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies
to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of
which is its racial composition. If school authorities
are concerned that the student-body compositions
of certain schools interfere with the objective of
offering an equal educational opportunity to all of
their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
48. Id. at 2793.
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measures to address the problem in a general way and
without treating each student in different fashion
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing
by race.
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing
together students of diverse backgrounds and
races through other means, including strategic site
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance,
and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are
race conscious but do not lead to different treatment
based on a classification that tells each student he
or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible.49
The examples offered by Justice Kennedy are already
commonly used by school districts and include "magnet schools"
that pull in students from surrounding neighborhoods in order
to promote greater diversity and establishing school attendance
boundaries that cross racially segregated neighborhoods in order
to prevent racial isolation.
49. Id. at 2792 (citations omitted). Justice Kennedy's opinion draws parallels
between these types of race-neutral policies and electoral districting, an area
in which the Court has held that strict scrutiny is not automatically triggered
unless race is the predominant factor. Id.
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C. Approving Compelling Interests: Kennedy and Breyer
Opinions
Beyond the holding of the Court, the multiple opinions
of the concurring and dissenting Justices in Parents Involved
in Community Schools indicate that school districts and other
governmental bodies can still employ race-conscious measures
if the underlying goals of the policy are designed to address
segregation and to promote diversity. Taking the Kennedy and
Breyer opinions together, it is clear that a five-member majority of
the current Supreme Court endorses the compelling interests in
avoiding racial isolation and in promoting educational diversity
in K-12 education.
1. Kennedy Opinion: Compelling Interests in Avoiding
Racial Isolation and Promoting Educational Diversity
Justice Kennedy declined to join Part III-B of Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion, which focuses on the compelling interests of
the school districts in promoting diversity and avoiding racial
isolation, as well as Part IV of the Roberts opinion. Early in his
opinion, Justice Kennedy states: "The plurality opinion is too
dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring
all people have equal opportunity regardless of race . . . To the
extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates
that state and local school authorities must accept the status
quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly
mistaken."50 He then makes clear that "[d]iversity, depending on
50. Id. at 2791.
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its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a
school district may pursue."'"
Distinguishing the interests asserted by the school districts
from an interest characterized by the Roberts plurality as "racial
balancing," Justice Kennedy's opinion makes clear that he endorses
two closely related compelling interests that could justify narrowly
tailored race-conscious policies:
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation
to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an
integrated society that ensures equal opportunity
for all of its children. A compelling interest exists
in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school
district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose
to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a
compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population. Race may be one component of that
diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special
talents and needs, should also be considered.
5 2
Justice Kennedy thus agrees with the Seattle and Louisville
school districts that avoiding racial isolation-which need
not be traced to intentional discrimination by government-
can be a compelling governmental interest. He also distances
himself from an argument made by the Roberts plurality that
de jure segregation arising through intentional governmental
discrimination can be remedied through race-conscious measures
while de facto segregation (and resegregation) arising through
housing patterns and private discrimination cannot.53
51. Id. at 2789.
52. Id. at 2797.
53. Id. at 2795. Justice Kennedy's opinion states: "The distinction between
government and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as a his-
torical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of fact." Id.
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Justice Kennedy additionally acknowledges that promoting
student body diversity in K-12 education can constitute a
compelling interest, but that interest is distinct from an interest in
promoting racial diversity alone. In other words, Justice Kennedy
endorses an interest in a broad form of educational diversity that
encompasses multiple dimensions-one that includes, but is not
limited to, race, and that parallels the higher education diversity
interest upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger. And consistent with Grutter,
the interest in elementary and secondary educational diversity is
one that can justify the consideration of race as a "plus" factor in
a multifactor selection or assignment process.
2. Breyer Opinion: A Compelling Interest in Racial
Integration
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which is joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, draws an even closer linkage
between the Grutter analysis and K-12 education, stating that
"[i] n light of this Court's conclusions in Grutter, the 'compelling'
nature of these interests in the context of primary and secondary
public education follows here afortiori. Primary and secondary
schools are where the education of this Nation's children begins,
where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us
to the end of our days."54 Although the vocabulary employed
by Justice Breyer to describe the school districts' interests differs
somewhat from Justice Kennedy's characterization, the core
interests overlap and are similarly compelling. Justice Breyer's
opinion goes to great lengths to stress the importance of "an
interest in promoting or preserving greater racial 'integration' of
public schools," which he describes as the "interest in eliminating
54. Id. at 2822 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to
which racial mixture characterizes each of the district's schools
and each individual student's public school experience."55
Justice Breyer concludes that this interest encompasses (1) a
historical and remedial element-an interest in setting right the
consequences of prior segregation, (2) an educational element-
an interest in overcoming the adverse effects associated with
highly segregated schools, and (3) a democratic element-an
interest in producing an educational environment that reflects
that pluralistic society in which children will live. His opinion
states:
The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes
an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general
'societal discrimination,' . . . but of primary and
secondary school segregation...; it includes an effort
to create school environments that provide better
educational opportunities for all children; it includes
an effort to help create citizens better prepared to
know, to understand, and to work with people of all
races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind
of democratic government our Constitution foresees.
If an educational interest that combines these three
elements is not "compelling," what is?56
Taken together, the Kennedy and Breyer opinions recognize
a compelling interest in addressing racial isolation that can
justify narrowly tailored race-conscious policies. Both opinions
also endorse a diversity interest, although Justice Breyer's "racial
integration" interest encompasses the racial diversity interest that
Justice Kennedy takes care in his opinion to distinguish from a
broader educational diversity interest. At the very least, however,
55. Id. at 2820.
56. Id. at 2823.
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language in the Breyer opinion that interprets the Grutter
educational interest to be applicable to the K-12 arena afortiori
implies that Justice Breyer and the other dissenting Justices
consider promoting educational diversity in K-12 education to
be a compelling interest as well.
D. Summary of Controlling Principles
With the division of the Justices in Parents Involved in
Community Schools, the controlling law is not entirely clear. The
analysis in Chief Justice Roberts' opinion where he speaks for
the Court provides some key principles, but Justice Kennedy's
opinion may ultimately offer the strict scrutiny guidelines that the
lower courts will follow in future litigation. His opinion provides
details on what may constitute narrowly tailored policies and
which types of educational policies should not be subject to strict
scrutiny at all; moreover, his compelling interest analysis, taken in
tandem with Justice Breyer's opinion, provides the core argument
for approving the compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation
and promoting educational diversity in K-12 education.
1. Strict Scrutiny Standard
The Roberts opinion for the Court makes clear that strict
scrutiny is the legal standard to be applied to student assignment
policies that employ race as a factor, and those types of plans
must be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.
The Roberts and Kennedy opinions also make clear that strict
scrutiny applies to voluntary race-conscious plans where there has
Vol. IO:SE
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been no past de jure segregation.5 7 The Court acknowledges that
context does matter in strict scrutiny analysis, but in the context
of K-12 educational policies involving racial classifications, the
type of good-faith deference that the Court extended to higher
education institutions in Grutter v. Bollinger does not apply.
Although the Court's reasons for invalidating the Seattle
and Louisville plans focus on specific problems with the plans,
voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans that are
similar to either of the plans are subject to strict scrutiny and are
likely to be unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests
that there may be very limited circumstances in which carefully
crafted racial classifications could satisfy strict scrutiny, if they
are demonstrated to be essential to achieving the goals of avoiding
57. Id. It is not clear how the Roberts and Kennedy opinions will affect exist-
ing voluntary desegregation plans made pursuant to court settlements or agree-
ments with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights where there
has been no specific finding or admission by the district of de jure segregation.
The Roberts plurality opinion would seem to require strict scrutiny for all plans
with no prior showing of de jure segregation, since Chief Justice Roberts gave
no weight to the past agreement between the Seattle district and the OCR as
a basis for justifying race-conscious remedies for de jure discrimination. Id. at
2761 n. 15 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Justice Kennedy's opinion also stresses
the de jure-de facto distinction, but his opinion indicates that voluntary de-
segregation in response to past de jure segregation would be distinct from the
voluntary plans at issue in Seattle and Louisville. Id. at 2795 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus, Justice Kennedy's
opinion suggests that voluntary plans obtained through settlements or OCR
agreements might be insulated from strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has upheld the application of disparate impact standards to recipients of
federal funding assistance "'to meet the special needs incident to the elimina-
tion of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and
faculty in elementary and secondary schools,"' and "to encourage 'the volun-
tary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation' in such
schools .... " Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 132 (1979) (upholding
disparate impact standards under Emergency School Aid Act).
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
racial isolation or promoting diversity and are demonstrated to be
compliant with other narrow tailoring requirements.
2. Compelling Interests
Only four members of the Court adopted the view that
the school districts' interests in addressing racial isolation
and promoting diversity, which the plurality recast as "racial
balancing," were not compelling. The remaining Justices would
uphold these interests as compelling if a case arose in the future-
and if the Court retains its current membership. The Kennedy
and Breyer opinions taken together do not establish a formal
holding of the Court, but they do provide a strong endorsement
of two distinct compelling interests-avoiding racial isolation and
promoting educational diversity-that school districts and other
governmental bodies can employ to defend their race-conscious
policies and that the lower courts can accept in future litigation.
3. Narrow Tailoring
In speaking for the Court, the Roberts opinion provides
only the most basic guidance on narrow tailoring, and the Court's
inquiries in Parents Involved in Community Schools are highly
specific to the Seattle and Louisville plans. At a minimum, school
districts employing race-conscious assignment policies must
have carefully explored race-neutral alternative policies and must
demonstrate the necessity of race-conscious plans. What would
satisfy a necessity inquiry, however, is not entirely clear. A race-
conscious plan must have a significant impact on advancing the
school district's interests, and cannot be tied solely to the racial
demographics of the district. Language in Justice Kennedy opinion
Vol. 10:SE
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further suggests that race-conscious plans should be precisely
written and be transparent in their implementation, and that the
nuances of the school district's population-specifically, relevant
differences among racial and ethnic groups-must be taken into
account.
IL K-12 Educational Policies and Racial
Integration: Navigating the Waters
The Court's rulings in Parents Involved in Community
Schools had the immediate consequence of invalidating the plans
in Seattle and Louisville.58 Student assignment plans in other
communities that employ comparable racial classifications and
do not address the narrow tailoring concerns of the Court and
Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved in Community Schools are
most likely unconstitutional as well. The rulings do not completely
foreclose the use of racial classifications, but if Justice Kennedy's
admonitions are to be heeded, employing racial classifications
without some degree of individualized consideration in assigning
students must be a policy of final resort. School districts that
choose to maintain racial classification systems must be able to
answer each of the narrow tailoring concerns raised by the Court
and by Justice Kennedy, which may be highly problematic for
many districts.
What, then, has the Supreme Court left school districts
to employ as constitutionally permissible policies? Five Justices
would uphold the interests in avoiding racial isolation and
58. The decision has also cast doubt on an earlier federal court of appeals
decision that upheld comparable student assignment policies in Lynn, Mas-
sachusetts. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 E3d 1 (1st Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
2008
HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 327 2008-2009
 TARY I N I S 327 
 t  t t -c nscious  l   is l  
   t   i ,  t  
s   l t'  i ll , levant 
es  l  ic - st  t  
t. 
  ial 
  \.Vater  
 '    nts it  
  t  ence  i    
  58 t i e t s t er 
 t l      
  i  s   
 ents   
t ti nal    t l  
 i l i i tions,    
  , i   
t lized r tion  i  
  .  i t i t  t t 
 i    t  l  t  
  t 
    tic  
 
  l  
 l  i i l  li i  i  ti  
  t  i t t  i  i i  r i l i l ti   
    li  l rt  l  
i i  t t l  r le st t ssi t licies i  , as-
tt . t .  l .,  F.  lOst ir.) (  a e), 
rt. ied,  . t.  ( ). 
RUTGERS RACEAND LAWREVIEW
promoting educational diversity, and nothing in the Kennedy or
Breyer opinions suggests that school districts must individually
document these interests through a strong basis in evidence in
order to satisfy constitutional standards. Instead, the means
employed to advance those compelling interests will be central
to determining whether school district policies are constitutional.
If avoiding racial isolation and promoting educational diversity
are compelling interests that can justify a variety of policies,
school districts must employ policies that are either (1) race-
neutral or (2) race-conscious and compliant with narrow tailoring
requirements.
Using Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion as a starting
point, there are three sets of potential policies that school districts
might adopt:
* "race-neutral" or "race-aware" policies that may
take into account race but do not employ racial
classifications
• Grutter-style assignment policies that employ
race as one of several factors in making student
assignments
a racial classifications that are of last resort and can
satisfy narrow tailoring
As Justice Kennedy's opinion indicates, the likelihood of
unconstitutionality increases as school districts move from race-
neutral policies to race-as-plus-factor policies that employ race
in a process of individualized consideration, and policies will
be presumptively unconstitutional if they employ explicit racial
classifications in individual student assignments. The bottom line
is that school districts must reexamine their current policies in
light of Parents Involved in Community Schools, and they should
be prepared to engage in creative policy making that stays within
Vol. 10:SE
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VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
constitutional limits but advances the goals of educational
diversity and avoiding racial isolation.
A. Race-Neutral and Race-Aware Policies
Justice Kennedy's opinion offers the following non-
exhaustive list of policies that may take race into account but do
not classify students by race:
* strategic site selection of new schools
• drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of
neighborhoods
* allocating resources for special programs
* recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion
* tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race
These policies typify programs in which school districts
can be mindful of racial demographics, patterns of housing
segregation, and student enrollment statistics, but do not
employ racial classifications on their face. Other race-neutral or
race-aware policies not mentioned by Justice Kennedy do exist.
For instance, many school districts have employed, with some
measure of success, student assignment policies that use criteria
such as socioeconomic status to promote racial diversity, because
these criteria can closely correlate with race. Another type of race-
neutral policy is a lottery or randomized assignment system that
may result in assignments and student bodies that parallel district-
wide demographics.
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Independent of their actual effectiveness, race-neutral or race-
aware policies should satisfy constitutional requirements because
they do not employ racial classifications and do not allocate
benefits or burdens on the basis of race; they are therefore unlikely
to trigger strict scrutiny in the first place. However, districts must
also be careful not to overstep the bounds of the Equal Protection
Clause by considering or weighing race too heavily. For instance,
the Supreme Court's recent case law on legislative districting
establishes a trigger for strict scrutiny whenever race is used as the
predominant factor in drawing district lines.59 Although the law
of electoral districting has not been transplanted to school district
line drawing, creating school attendance zones with race as the
predominant factor might subject a policy to strict scrutiny; while
this does not mean that a policy would be unconstitutional, it
could be subject to heightened review by the courts if challenged
in litigation.
B. Race-as-Plus-Factor Policies
Justice Kennedy's opinion does not provide detailed guidance
on what might be a Grutter-like policy employing individualized
consideration of students at the elementary and secondary
school levels. His opinion states that "a district may consider it a
compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race
may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic
factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered." °
A clear parallel to admissions in higher education is admission to
a K-12 school or program with a competitive selection process-
for example, an elite college preparatory high school-in which
59. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
60. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2797.
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factors such as grades, test scores, extracurricular activities,
residency, and socioeconomic status could be taken into account,
along with a student's race or ethnicity, in order to select a student
body. However, it is more difficult to envision a holistic, race-
as-plus-factor policy involving a large number of students across
multiple schools and programs.
Lessons learned in higher education admissions suggest that
there are procedures in which multiple criteria can be considered
in making selection decisions, including admissions policies used
at some of the largest public universities. These types of policies,
where race is used as a plus factor along with other individualized
factors, could be adapted to apply to enrollment and transfer
decisions at the K- 12 grade levels. While the design and
implementation of these policies in populous and demographically
diverse school districts might be challenging, they are not
insurmountable. For example, the controlled choice policy struck
down in the Seattle school district attempted to employ race as
one of a series of tiebreakers (along with residency and sibling
status) to determine high school assignments. A constitutionally
compliant policy might employ race, residency, sibling status, and
a range of additional factors to determine whether an individual
student should be assigned to a particular school.
There are, of course, many questions left to be answered.
For example, what additional criteria should be included in
individualized determinations affecting student assignments? Do
these criteria vary by a student's age or grade level? May numerical
goals and ranges still be employed to address racial isolation or
to promote diversity? If so, how do the specific racial and ethnic
demographics within a district affect those goals? Some of these
questions may only be answered as school districts take steps to
revise their policies and develop new policies, and the legality
2008
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RUTGERS RACEAND LAWREVIEW
of some programs may ultimately have to be tested through
litigation.
C. Last-Resort Racial Classifications
The Kennedy opinion still leaves the door open for
limited uses of racial classifications that do not employ Grutter-
style procedures, but stresses that there must be a very strong
demonstration of necessity before they can be upheld: there must
be "some extraordinary showing"" of need and "measures other
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals
first must be exhausted. ' 2 This language suggests that alternative
policies not only need to be seriously considered, they may have to
be employed and proved unsuccessful before a racial classification
system can be attempted-an especially heavy burden on school
districts.
Based on Justice Kennedy's criticisms of the Seattle and
Louisville plans, a race-conscious plan would have to have a well-
documented impact on advancing the school district's interests in
addressing racial isolation and promoting diversity, but not be so
inflexible or burdensome on students that it would violate other
narrow tailoring concerns. The racial demographics of the district,
including relevant differences among racial and ethnic groups,
would have to be taken into account, but not used merely to set
goals of racial proportionality. Racial classification plans must also
be precisely written and be transparent in their implementation.
61. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
62. Id. at 2797.
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The door has not been slammed shut on racial classifications
in K-12 education, but Justice Kennedy's standards are very
difficult to satisfy.
III. Impact on Equal Protection Doctrine
When examined in conjunction with other recent Supreme
Court cases circumscribing the boundaries of race-conscious
affirmative action, 63 electoral districting designed to promote
minority voting rights,64 and desegregation policies crafted
to enforce the mandates of Brown v. Board of Education,65 the
outcome in Parents Involved in Community Schools is not altogether
surprising. The Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence has
become increasingly hostile to race-conscious policy making, and
a majority of the current Court is deeply skeptical of policies that
employ race, even those that advance important social goals such
as integrated public education.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Seattle and
Louisville cases is that several members of the Court have called
into question the basic interpretation of Brown, with members
of the Roberts plurality arguing for an entirely color-blind
interpretation of Brown and the Equal Protection Clause, and
going so far as to propose that "[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is stop discriminating on the basis of race. 66
Justice Kennedy's opinion tempers that extreme reinterpretation
63. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
64. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
65. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Board of Educ. of Okla. City
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
66. Parents Involved in Cnty Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J.).
2008
HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 333 2008-2009
 RY  I S 333 
       
, '    
. 
lL   
  i     
t ribing   
i  ti n,63 l   
t   ts,64  ti   
   .  tion, 65  
 ents l   t r 
'  l ti n ce  
   i s  
 t      
  t   
   . 
  i     
ill  t   t ll d 
  ti   
      ti l  l lind 
t tion    l t ti  l ,  
 e i i tion 
 i ting   ."66 
 '    t  i t t tion 
,  n );   
i  . . .  .,  . .  ( ). 
. .  ); .   
). 
.  . );   
 . ,   ). 
ents m .  . c.].  
RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
of the Constitution, but there is still a majority on the current
Court that is inclined to limit-if not eliminate-many race-
conscious policies that are designed to promote equal opportunity.
The rulings in the Seattle and Louisville cases have broader
implications for equal protection doctrine, race-conscious policy
making, and civil rights litigation, which include some of the
following concerns:
A. Limiting Grutter v. Bollinger
While all of the Justices recognized that Grutter v. Bollinger
is good law and a viable precedent, the Parents Involved in
Community Schools majority compartmentalized Grutter in
significant ways that may limit its applicability outside of higher
education. Dismissing any parallels in context between higher
education and K-12 education, the majority declared that "[t]he
present cases are not governed by Grutter.6 7 Indeed, Chief Justice
Roberts not only distinguished Grutter's higher education context
from elementary and secondary education, he argued that higher
education is a unique context. Writing for the Court, he stated:
In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter..
this Court relied upon considerations unique
to institutions of higher education, noting that
in light of "the expansive freedoms of speech and
thought associated with the university environment,
universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition." The Court explained that
"[ciontext matters" in applying strict scrutiny, and
repeatedly noted that it was addressing the use of
race "in the context of higher education."68
67. Id. at 2754.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
Vol. IO:SE
HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 334 2008-2009
334   l. 10 5  
t t r i   j t  
t i  t l  
i  li i  t t  it . 
 r li  i  t    
    
i ,    
ll i   
.   . r 
il  ll  t  ti   tter .  
is  l   ents  
it  l  j it  talized tter  
si ifi t  t t   ilit   
ti . i i i   ll l  t  
education a  -  ti , t  j it    e 
present cases are t r   utter."67 , J  
erts t l  i ti i  tter's   t t 
fro  ele e tary  s r  ti ,    
education is a i e t t. riti     
In upholding t e issi s l  i  tt r . . 
. this ourt relied upon c si erations i  
to institutions of higher education, ti  t t 
in light of "the expansive freedo s f s   
thought associated ith the university environ ent, 
uniVerSItieS occupy a s ecial i  i   
constitutional tradition." he rt e lai e  t t 
"[c]ontext atters" i  l ing t i t ti ,  
repeatedly noted that it as addressing the se f 
race "in the context f i er ti n."68 
67. I . at 54. 
68. ! . (citations itt ). 
VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION POLICIES
The Chief Justice continued: "The Court in Grutter expressly
articulated key limitations on its holding--defining a specific type
of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher
education-but these limitations were disregarded by the lower
courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in
elementary and secondary schools."69 He then concluded that
Grutter did not apply at all to the Seattle and Louisville cases.7°
By portraying higher education admissions as sui generis,
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion leaves little doubt that he is
attempting to confine Grutter's value as a precedent-not only
for K-12 education but for other settings where race-conscious
policies are in use. Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer rely
on Grutter in large part to defend their recognition of diversity as
a compelling interest in K-12 education, so the language in Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion is undermined in practical terms by the
other Justices' opinions. Nonetheless, language in the Roberts
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools may lead other
courts to discount Grutter as an applicable precedent in key areas
outside of higher education, such as employment in the public
schools and other governmental jobs, 7 1 where diversity-based
policies have been deployed.
69. Id.
70. See Id.
71. A discussion of the impact of Parents Involved in Community Schools on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other laws that affect private-
sector employment is beyond the scope of this analysis. The law governing
race-conscious affirmative action in private employment differs in important
ways from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence on affirmative action,
but the reasoning in Parents Involved in Community Schools may ultimately
have significant effects on how the courts evaluate diversity-based programs
interests in other sectors.
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B. Context and Strict Scrutiny Analysis
In upholding the University of Michigan's law school
admissions policy, the Grutter Court stated that "[clontext
matters" in applying strict scrutiny; moreover, the Court ruled,
"[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable,
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of
race in that particular context." 2 Because Grutter arose in the
context of higher education, where academic freedom and First
Amendment considerations were also implicated, the Court
employed a careful, but less searching review under strict scrutiny
and deferred in important ways to institutions of higher learning.
The Grutter Court did not, for example, require a strong basis in
evidence for universities to justify their interest in diversity, and
the Court presumed good-faith compliance in a number of its
narrow tailoring inquiries.
The Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools
distinguished higher education from K-12 education, and
employed a strict scrutiny standard that offered no deference
to the school districts. Consequently, the Court's review was
considerably more skeptical than the standard adopted in Grutter.
For instance, the majority did not accept the good-faith attempts
of the Seattle school district to consider race-neutral alternatives,
and ignored the lengthy history of past desegregation efforts in
both Seattle and Louisville that could help establish the context
in which the policies arose.
Part IV of Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion is
emphatic in its rejection of a relaxed strict scrutiny, proposing
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
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that earlier cases "reject the argument that motives affect the strict
scrutiny analysis" and that deference to local school boards "is
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence." 73
His opinion is thus in direct opposition to Justice Breyer's
contextual approach to the Seattle and Louisville plans, where he
and the other dissenting Justices would have employed a careful
but more relaxed scrutiny to uphold the plans. Justice Breyer's
analysis takes into account both the motives of the policy makers
and the courts' traditional deference to local governmental
decision making. Justice Breyer accordingly characterized Roberts'
standard of review as one that is "fatal in fact across the board. 74
By failing to extend a contextual analysis to the school
districts' policies in Parents Involved in Community Schools-what
Justice Stevens described in his dissent as "a wooden reading of the
Equal Protection Clause"7 5-the majority revealed its cynicism
toward race-conscious policies and its unwillingness to modify
strict scrutiny in order to take into account important factual
and institutional differences. The Court did not say that context
should never matter, which would have effectively confined
contextual deference to Grutter itself, but the Court offered no
guidance on when and how context should make a difference in
the future.
C. Narrow Tailoring and Race-Neutral Alternatives
Neither Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion nor
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools radically changes the law of narrow tailoring. Yet, their
73. Parents Involved in Cnty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2764, 2766.
74. Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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RUTGERS RACE AND LAW REVIEW
inquiries under narrow tailoring reflect an opposition to racial
classifications that may make future inquiries especially rigorous.
In writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts' narrow tailoring
analysis focused heavily on whether the policies were necessary
to advance a compelling interest. In assessing the necessity of
the plans, Chief Justice Roberts approached the inquiry in a
backhanded way: he inferred that they were not necessary because
they employed race ineffectively and the objectives of the policy
could have been accomplished through other means. Similarly,
Justice Kennedy criticized the Louisville plan for its lack of
precision and transparency in making race-conscious decisions.
Yet, in order to be consistent with case law such as Grutter, the
districts' plans intentionally downplayed race as a factor in order
to comply with the requirements that they be flexible and not
unduly burden non-minority students. In the future, navigating
safe waters between flexibility and limited burdens on the one
hand and effectiveness and necessity on the other hand may prove
to be hazardous for policy makers attempting to comply with
narrow tailoring.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion offers a number of race-
neutral and race-conscious policies that that he might uphold as
constitutional, his narrow tailoring analysis in Parents Involved
in Community Schools is exacting and implies that he may only
accept overt racial classifications when there is an extraordinary
showing of need. Justice Kennedy may insist in the future that
before race-conscious policies can be employed, "measures other
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals
first must be exhausted." 76 This language suggests that policy
makers may only be able to employ explicitly race-conscious
76. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
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policies after they have already attempted race-neutral policies,
which is a significantly higher burden than merely having to go
through a good-faith consideration of race-neutral policies. Both
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts have elevated the role
of race-neutral alternatives as a means for striking down racial
classifications, and their standards, if adopted in later cases, may
prove to be unreachable by many policy makers.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Parents Involvedin Community
Schools marks a major shift in its equal protection jurisprudence
and its dedication to defending equal educational opportunity.
The case demonstrates that the Court, like the American public,
remains deeply divided on questions of race and race-conscious
policy making. Thus even today, over fifty years after the Court's
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the goals and methods of
achieving equality espoused in Brown are still hotly contested. The
impact of the Seattle and Louisville cases on school assignment
policies will be significant, but the legal mandates of the case
do not foreclose creative and dedicated policy making designed
to promote diversity and to avoid racial isolation in the nation's
schools. Nothing in the Court's decision should diminish the
integration ideal implicit in Brown. The Seattle and Louisville
cases should instead provide the public and government at all
levels with a strong impetus to further advance equality and to
promote educational opportunities within the bounds of the
Constitution.
2008
HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 339 2008-2009
2008  S L I IES 339 
t  l  
i  l     
t    l  
ti     
 t l   
l i i ti ,     
     
 
 r  t'  li   nts l  unity 
ls r   j r i t i  it   ti   
 it  i ti   i g  l  
he case e strates t t t  rt, li  t  i   
r i s l  i i   ti      
li  i .   t ,     '  
ruling i  r  v. r  f tion, t  l   t  f 
achieving e alit  s s  i  r  r  till tl  t t .  
i pact of the Seattle and ouisville cases  sc l ssi ent 
policies ill be significant, t t  l l t s  t   
do not f recl se r ti   i ted li  i  i ed 
to pro ote i ersit   t  i  r i l i l ti  i  t  ti '  
schools. othing in the rt's ecisi  s l  i i i  t  
integration ideal i plicit i  r .  ttl   i ill  
cases should instead provide the public a  er e t t ll 
levels ith a strong i petus t  f rt er  lit   t  
pro ote educational opportunities ithin t e s f t  
stit ti . 
